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Abstract 
This paper  considers  the role of  monetary  policy in  an  economy  with 
rational expectations  and  a nominal  wage  contracting constraint.  To  this 
end,  a monetary economy  with nominal  wage  contracting is constructed in  a 
simple neoclassical  growth model.  It is shown  that when  utility is 
logarithmic in  consumption  that a money  supply  rule designed  to  either peg 
nominal  interest rates or target nominal  output  will be  optimal  for this 
economy.  In  more  general  formulations of  utility  no  specific policy 
reccomendations  can  be  made,  optimal monetary  policy can  be  either 
procyclical or countercyclical depending on  the exact form of  the utility 
function. I.  Introduction 
This  paper  considers  the role of  monetary  policy in  an  economy  with 
rational expectations  and  a nominal  wage-contracting constraint.  Building 
upon  the work  of Fischer  (1977),  households  and  firms are (by  assumption) 
required to  agree on a nominal  wage  before the realization of the real and 
monetary  shocks.  The  prototype of the model  developed  is from Prescott 
(1983).  Prescott reconsidered the nominal  wage-contracting model  of  Fischer 
and put Fischer's  system of equations into a simple neoclassical  growth model 
with rational expectations. 
Prescott's model  is  modified to  include economy-wide  supply shocks  and 
possible policy responses  conditional on  these  shocks.  In  addition,  money  is 
introduced into the system by  including real balances  in the utility function 
instead of  a cash-in-advance constraint.  This is  done  so  that the 
introduction of  money  does  not influence any  real quantities (assuming  that 
utility is  separable).  The  optimal monetary policy will depend  on  the money 
demand  equation,  so  including real balances  in  the utility  function also 
allows one  to  easily consider different formulations for money  demand. 
Because  nominal  wages  are contracted prior to  money  supply 
announcements,  monetary  pol i  cy can  have  real effects  by i  nf  1  uenci  ng  the pri  ce 
level and,  hence,  real wages.  Similarly,  since wages  are contracted prior to 
the observance of the productivity shocks,  employment  cannot  adjust to  its 
first  best (flex wage)  level.  Assuming  that monetary policy can  be  made  after 
the real shock  is  observed,  monetary  policy can  potentially increase  the 
welfare of the representative consumer.  The  money  supply can  be  inflated or 
deflated to  increase or decrease  the real wage  and  to  mimic  the spot-market 
wage  that would  arise without an  ad  hoc  nominal  wage-contracting constraint. Although monetary  policy can  stabilize output,  it  will not generally be 
desirable  to  do  so.  The  money-supply  rule,  which maximizes  the utility  of the 
representative consumer  and  provides that the firm  earn zero profits, may  be 
either procycPica1 or countercyclical.  The  correct monetary response  will 
depend  on  the consumption  elasticity of  money  demand  and  the consumer's 
relative degree of risk aversion. 
Assuming  utility is logarithmic in  consumption,  a policy rule designed 
either to  peg  the nominal  interest rate at a given level or to  stabilize 
nominal  output  will produce  the first  best  (flex wage)  quantities.  The 
Federal  Reserve  Board  currently targets the nominal  interest rate,  while 
several  economists  have  long advocated a policy rule to  target nominal 
output.  In  the special  case  in  which utility is logarithmic in  consumption 
both policy rules are identical as  well as  optimal.  These  rules amount  to 
pursuing a procyclical (countercyclical)  money  supply rule if the income 
elasticity of  money  demand  is  greater (less)  than one. 
The  case  in  which  utility is  not logarithmic in  consumption,  but is 
logarithmic in  real money  balances,  leads  to  similar policy conclusions.  The 
optimal  policy can  be  either procyclical or countercyclical depending  on  the 
relative degree of  risk aversion of the representative household.  Procyclical 
(countercyclical)  monetary policy would be  favored if the degree of  relative 
risk aversion is greater (less)  than one. 
The  structure of  the paper  is as  follows:  section I1 describes  the 
environment  in  terms  of tastes,  technology,  and  endowments  and  then defines an 
equilibrium for this economy.  Section I11  characterizes the equilibrium and 
discusses  the appropriate policy response  to various productivity shocks.  The 
final section discusses  whether  nominal  contracting models  can  be  used  for policy purposes  given the current information on  the form of  the utility 
function and  the empirical  validity of  nominal  contracting models. 
11.  An  Economy  with Nominal  Wage  Contracts 
The  evolution of the economy  is  as  follows:  the representative household 
enters into each  period with cash  and  capital carried over from the previous 
period (except  for the initial period,  where  cash  and  capital are given as 
endowments).  The  worker  then signs a contract with a firm  specifying the 
nominal  hourly wage  that will be  paid in the coming period.  By  assumption, 
this wage  contract cannot  be  indexed to  either the monetary  injection or  the 
price level.  However,  the number  of hours  worked  can  be  made  conditional on 
both productivity shocks  and monetary  shocks.  Hours  are allowed to  depend on 
the monetary  shock  in  order for monetary  injections to  have  real effects. 
After the shocks  occur,  the household rents capital  stock  to  a firm  (not 
necessarily its  employer)  for a rental rate,  u,  and  works  the number  of  hours 
specified by  the contract,  contingent upon  the realizations of the monetary 
injection and  the productivity shock. 
At the end  of  the period,  the household receives  its  rental and  wage 
payments  in  cash  from the firm(s>.  For  simplicity, it  is  assumed  that capital 
depreciates  completely after one  period.  The  rental price of capital  is thus 
the purchase price of capital.  The  household  then combines  the wage  and 
rental payments  with the initial currency holdings and  any  lump-sum  monetary 
transfers from the monetary  authorities to  choose  the amount  of consumption 
for that period and  the amount  of capital  and  cash it  wishes  to  carry over into the next period.  Money  will be  held in equilibrium because  of the 
utility it  provides  the household. 
The  per  capita money  stock evolves  according  to the following formula: 
M,,,  =  M,(l+x),  where  x  is  a random  variable and  M,  is the economy-wide 
money  stock (which,  in  equilibrium,  will be  equal  to the amount  held by  the 
representative  consumer)  at the beginning of  period t.  Increases  in the money 
stock are brought about  by  lump-sum  transfers to  the household(s)  from  the 
monetary  authorities.  It is  assumed  that the probability density function of 
the monetary  injections,  x,  is f(x:K,,M,,B,),  where  8,  is the 
productive  shock  realized in  period t. 
Conditioning the distribution on  K,  M,  and  8  is  due  to  the assumption 
that the monetary authorities can  choose  the money  supply after observing  the 
state of the economy  in that period.  Without  the real shock,  the optimal 
monetary policy would  be  to  maintain a constant money  stock or given that the 
monetary  authorities have  the necessary revenues  to  deflate the money  stock at 
the rate of time preference. 
The  productivity shock,  8,  is assumed  to  be  a strictly positive random 
variable that is identically,  independently distributed over  time with a 
probability density function of g(8).  Furthermore,  it  is  assumed  that 8 
affects production multiplicatively.  The  production function is assumed  to 
have  the form  8F(kt,ht),  where  F(.,.)  is  assumed  to  be  homogeneous  of 
degree one  in  labor,  h,  and  capital,  k.  The  technology  is further assumed  to 
have  the form that capital  and  the consumption  good  can  be  transformed  without 
cost from one  to  another. 
Firms  are assumed  to  be  profit maximizers operating in  a purely 
competitive environment.  This ensures  that capital  and  labor will be  chosen in  such  a way  that the value of the marginal  productivity of capital  is  equal 
to  the rental price of  capital and  that the value of the marginal  productivity 
of labor is  equal  to  the wage  rate.  The  constant-returns-to-scale assumption 
ensures  that,  in  equilibrium,  firms will earn zero profits.  The  assumption  is 
not necessary.  However,  it  simplifies the analysis  since the dividends 
households  receive from firms no  longer have  to  be  considered. 
The  representative household  is  assumed  to  have  preferences over 
consumption,  c,,  leisure,  1-ht  (where  0  <  h,  <  I>,  and  real money 
balances , m,  + ,  /pt , as  fol  lows : 
where  0  <  I3  <  1  is  the discount factor and  u(.,.>  and  H(.)  have  all of the 
usual  properties:  concave,  twice differentiable,  and  increasing in  their 
arguments.  The  above  expectation is  taken  to  be  conditional on  the 
information set at time zero,  the initial conditions  KO and  Mo.  Capital 
letters denote  aggregate  variables over  which  the individual has  no control, 
while lower-case  letters represent a choice  variable for the individual. 
However,  in  equilibrium,  the quantities chosen by  the individual will be  equal 
to  those for the economy  as  a whole. 
The  equilibrium contract will be  chosen  so it  maximizes  the utility  of 
the representative consumer,  subject to  the capi  tal and  1  abor  the firm  wi  11 
hire at the chosen rental and  wage  rates,  and  subject to  the budget  constraint 
for  the individual.  The  following is the planning problem for this economy: Problem  H: 
max  E,{~R'~u(c,  ,1-h,)  +  H(mt+~lpt)l1 
w,,ut(.>,ct(.)  0 
mt+l(.>,kt+l(.) 
Constraints 1 and  2  are the "reaction functions" for the  firm,  which 
specify how  much  labor and  capital  will be  chosen  by  the firm  at various wage 
and  rental rates.  Constraint  3  is the budget  constraint for  the  worker.  The 
notation ut(.>,  ct(.>, ... etc.  denotes  the rental rate on  capital, 
consumption,  next period's capital,  and  next period's money  stock are all 
chosen  conditional on  kt, M,,  mt,  8,,  x,.  The  wage  rate,  w,, 
denotes  w(kt,m,,,Mt>  since,  by  assumption,  wages  cannot  depend  on  x  or 
8. 
The  price of consumption and  capital,  p,,  is  taken as  given by  the 
firm  and  worker  in  problem H.  In equilibrium,  pt will be  chosen  in such  a 
way  that the money  market  clears,  M,  =  m,. 
The  household's  budget  constraint consists of income  from  capital and 
labor as  well  as  money  carried over  from the previous  period and  the  lump-sum 
transfer from the monetary  authorities,  Mtx.  The  household  spends  its income  on current consumption  as  well as  on the capital and  currency it  wishes 
to  carry over  into the next period. 
The  problem is  stated in  this form  instead of the "dual" formulation 
since competition by firms for workers  and  capital ensures  that the wage  rate 
and  rental rate of capital  will be  chosen  optimally from the household's point 
of  view.  Otherwise,  a firm  could enter and  make  positive profits  while the 
household remains  at least as  well off  as  before. 
We  are now  ready to  define an  equilibrium for this economy: 
Definition of Equi 1  ibrium: 
A  stationary equilibrium for this economy  requires that the following 
conditions are satisfied: 
1)  w,,  u,(.),  kt+,(.),  ht(.),  ct(.),  mt+,(.)  are chosen  to satisfy 
Problem H  for t =  1,  2,  .  .  .  . 
2)  P,  is  chosen  such  that the money  market clears: 
3) The  unit of account does  not matter,  that is  P,,  W,,  Ut are 
homogenous  of  degree one  in  last period's money  stock M,. 
This completes  the definition of equilibrium.  The  next section 
considers various functional forms  for the production function and  the utility 
function in  order  to  talk about  the optimal  monetary policy. 111.  Real  Shocks  and Monetary  Policy 
In  this section,  the utility  is  assumed  to have  a  constant  intertemporal 
elasticity of substitution,  while the production function is  assumed  to be 
Cobb-Douglas.  The  forms  for both are as  follows: 
u(c,l-h)  =  LC'-"  -  ll/(l-a)  +  v(1-h) 
H(mt+l /pt> =  C(mt+  /pt)'-b-l  l/(l-b) 
F(k,h)  =  kah  -OE 
where  0  <  a  <  1,  a . 
With these functional forms,  the first-order conditions for Problem H  are 
as  follows: 
(3.6)  A,,  =  m;:l(l/pt>l-b  +  REt+i(A3t+i) 
(3.8)  lim  BtEt+l(A3tptkt+l)  =  0 
t*°~ 
where  Et(.)  =  E,,e(.:Kt,Mt)  and  Ai  (i  =  1,2,3>  is the costate 
variable associated with the i  constraint. Equation 3.1  states  that the marginal  utility  of  real balances  is  equal 
to  the marginal  utility  of  consumption.  Equation 3.2  states that the capital 
market clears.  Condition 3.3  is  identical except  that,  because  of the nominal 
wage-contracting constraint,  the labor market  will  only clear "on average." 
Equation 3.4  states that investment occurs  until the marginal  cost of 
investing in  terms of forgone  consumption  is  equal  to the discounted expected 
benefits due  to increased production next period.  Equation 3.6  is  the demand 
for nominal  cash balances,  while equations 3.7  and  3.8  are the terminal or 
transversal i  ty  condi tion. 
Because  of the nominal  contracting constraint,  employment  increases 
(decreases)  with money  supply increases  that are larger (smaller)  than 
expected.  Using equations  3.1,  3.3,  and  3.5  we  can  see  that,  on average,  the 
representative worker  will be  neither over-  or  underemployed.  Overemployment 
(underemployment)  is  defined as  when  the worker  is  working more  (less)  than he 
would wish  to  (ex  post)  in  a  spot market  at the prevailing wage  rate. 
Underemployment occurs  when  monetary  injections are smaller  than expected, 
while overemployment occurs when  monetary  injections are larger than 
expected.  Although underemployment  is  akin to  involuntary unemployment,  the 
two  should not be  treated synonymously,  since by  definition there is  only one 
worker  in  this artificial economy. 
As  will be  seen,  the money  supply rule that maximizes  the utility  of the 
representative worker  will eliminate overemployment  and  underemployment. 
However,  since underemployment  and  overemployment  are not observable,  it is 
necessary  to  discuss what  the money  supply rule should be  with respect to 
observable variables,  namely  output and  prices. 
Using  the transversality conditions equations,  3.4  and  3.6  can  be  solved 
recursively yielding: (3.4')  yt~;a =  C(UR>~E~+~  (c;;:)  and 
S =o 
Equation 3.6'  shows  that the marginal  utility  of  nominal  cash  balances, 
X3,  is decreasing in  both current and  expected future  monetary 
injections.  Combining  3.6'  with 3.1  gives  the demand  for real cash  balances 
or equivalently shows  how  the price level  -is determined  in  equilibrium,  given 
the market-clearing condition mt+,  =  Mt+l: 
00  S 
where  Bt  =  CRsE,+,II{CII(l+~i  )l'-b[l/(l+~i  )Ib} 
s=o  I =o 
pt+i+l  =  pt+i(l+~i)  and  Mt+i+l =  Mt+i(l+xi). 
Equation 3.9  shows  that real money  balances  are decreasing in  the 
expectation of  future monetary injections.  It  also indicates that the 
consumption elasticity of  money  demand  is greater (less)  than one  when  a  >  (<I 
b,  or when  the desire to  smooth  consumption  is  greater  (less)  than the desire 
to smooth  real cash  balances  over time.  The  intuition behind this result can 
be  seen most  clearly if  one  assumes  that Bt  is  constant.  In  this case,  when 
the desire to  smooth  consumption  and  the desire to  smooth  real cash  balances 
are equal,  a =  b,  money  balances  are proportional  to  consumption.  Similarly, 
when  the desire to  smooth  consumption over  time  is greater  than it  is to 
smooth real balances over  time,  a >  b,  increases  or decreases  in  consumption 
wi  11  be  magnified through the price level  so that the time  series for 
consumption  will be  smoother  than it  is for  real money  balances. The  nominal  interest rate in this economy  is  given by  the following 
equation: 
One,  plus the nominal  rate of interest,  equals  the ratio  of the marginal 
utility  of  nominal  balances  today and  the present discounted value of what it 
is  expected to  be  tomorrow.  The  optimal  money  supply rule when  wages  are 
flexible is  the FriedmanISidrauski  rule of deflating the money  supply  such 
that the nominal  interest rate approaches  zero,  or equivalently such  that the 
marginal  utility  of  nominal  cash balances  grows  at the rate of  time 
preference.  This  will entail deflating the money  supply at a constant rate 
only when  b =  1. 
IV.  Optimal  Monetary  Policy 
This  section considers  the optimal monetary  policy in  response  to  real 
productivity shocks.  We  proceed  by finding the money  supply rule that 
reproduces  the quantities that would be  chosen  in  a world with flexible 
wages.  Since real money  balances  enter separably in  the uti  1 i  ty  function, 
this also reproduces  the quantities that would  be  chosen  by  the social  planner 
in  the standard optimal  growth model  without money. 
The  first step in  discussing the optimal money  supply rule is to  restate 
the first-order conditions of problem H  when  the nominal  wage-contracting 
constraint is lifted.  These  first-order conditions  are  identical to those given by  equations  3.1  - 3.8  (including 3.4'  and  3.6'1,  except  for the 
first-order condition with respect to  choosing the optimal  wage,  equation 
3.3.  This,  in  turn,  affects the  labor supply that will be  chosen,  equation 
3.5.  When  real instead of  nominal  wages  are chosen  equations  3.3  and  3.5 
become : 
(4.1)  Xlt  =  X3tht and 
(4.2)  ~'(1-ht)  =  X,tWt. 
Since X3 is  the marginal  utility  of consumption  divided by  the price 
level,  equation 4.2  indicates that workers  will never be  underemployed or 
overemployed.  This,  of  course,  is  not surprising. 
The  optimal  money  supply rule due  to  the nominal  contracting constraint 
will be  discussed in two  stages:  the first stage  lets "b"  vary but sets  a=l, 
i.e.  utility  is logarithmic in  consumption.  The  second  case  lets "a" vary but 
sets  b=l,  i.e.  utility  is  logarithmic  in  real money  balances. 
A.  Logarithmic  Consumption,  a=l 
Setting a=l  and  replacing equations  3.3,  3.5  with 4.1  and  4.2,  the 
first-order conditions with flexible wages  become: 
(4.3)  .ct =  (1-a8)yt 
(4.4)  kt+,  =  aBy, 
(4.5)  ~'(1-ht)ht  =  (1-a)l(l-aB)  and 
(4.6)  mt+  /pt  =  Bl'b~:"b. 03 
where  A,,  =  ~~~~~+~(m;~,+,(llp,+~)'-~~  and 
s=o 
The  first three are  standard when  utility is logarithmic  in 
consumption.  Consumption and  investment are proportional to  output,  while 
labor  supply  is  constant,  because  with logarithmic  consumption  and  100  percent 
depreciation of capital,  the income  and  substitution effects cancel  out. 
From  equations 4.3  and  3.10,  the FriedmanISidrauski  rule to  pursue  a 
monetary policy such  that the nominal  interest rate is  near  zero implies that 
the monetary  authorities should pursue a policy of  deflating nominal  income  at 
the household's  rate of time preference.  If the government  wishes  to  collect 
a given amount of tax revenue  over  time via the  inflation tax,  it  should let 
nominal  output grow at a predetermined  rate. 
The  employment  level that results with a nominal  contracting constraint 
can be  seen  by  noting that A3wh =  (1-a)Lpy.  Labor  supply is then: 
Since wages  by assumption cannot be  indexed  to  monetary and productivity 
shocks,  employment  responds  to  monetary  and  real  shocks  only through their 
effect on  the marginal  utility  of nominal  balances.  Equation 4.7  indicates 
that employment  responds  negatively to  positive productivity shocks  when  b  < 
1,  while employment  increases  with positive productivity shocks  when  b  >  1. 
These  results can  be  seen  from equation 4.6,  which  shows  that prices and 
productivity shocks  are negatively related.  Not  surprisingly,  equation 4.7 also shows  that employment  increases  with monetary  innovations.  From  equation 
4.6  this indicates that given a constant money  supply,  employment  will be 
procyclical (countercyclical)  when  the income  elasticity of  money  demand  is 
less (greater)  than unity.  The  reason  for this can  be  seen  by  recalling the 
second  constraint in  problem H,  wt  =  ptetFl(kt,lt).  When  the 
income  elasticity is greater than one,  the percentage  decrease  in  prices will 
be  greater than the percentage  increase in  output.  Therefore,  py and,  hence, 
8p  will necessarily decrease  with productivity shocks,  implying that 
employment  will decrease  when  productivity increases.  The  above  argument  can 
be  reversed when  the income  elasticity of  money  demand  is  less than one  to 
show  that employment  will increase with increases in  productivity. 
Since  employment  is constant when  wages  are flexible and  utility is 
logarithmic  in  consumption,  the optimal  monetary policy can  be  either 
procyclical  or countercyclical.  The  optimal monetary policy will be 
procyclical when  the income  elasticity of  money  demand  is  less than one  (a=l, 
b>l) and  countercyclical  when  the income  elasticity of  money  demand  is  greater 
than one  (a=l,  bcl).  Equivalently,  when  productivity increases by 1 percent, 
instead of  real wages  increasing by  1 percent as  they would  with flexible 
wages,  they increase by more  than 1 percent  when  the income  elasticity of 
money  demand  is  greater  than one.  Monetary  policy should then be  procyclical 
in  order to  reduce real wages  to  their spot market  level.  This also serves  to 
increase employment  and  to  reduce or eliminate underemployment. 
Underemployment  exists in this case  since  the  increase in  real wages  is  more 
than is  optimal.  Similarly,  when  the  income  elasticity of  money  demand  is 
less than one,  real wages  do not increase  as  much  as  they would  with flexible 
wages,  so  that the government  should pursue a countercyclical  monetary  policy. One  caveat to  the possibility of procyclical monetary policy should be 
noted.  Procyclical  monetary  policy applies only if the increase or decrease 
in  output was  caused  by real factors  and  not by reckless monetary policy. 
Calling for either procyclical or countercyclical  monetary policy 
provides  directional guidance;  however,  it  begs  the crucial question:  By  how 
much?  Without answering this question,  Friedman's  4 percent money  supply rule 
might be  called for on  grounds  that the cure might be  worse  than  the disease. 
Fortunately,  when  utility is logarithmic in  consumption,  a simple money  supply 
rule to  target nominal  output  will achieve  the first  best allocation. 
Comparing equations  4.5  and  4.7  implies  that a policy of stabilizing the 
marginal  utility  of nominal  balances,  X3,  (or letting it  grow or shrink at 
a predetermined rate)  will achieve  the first  best employment  level.  From  the 
first-order conditions from problem H,  this is  equivalent to  stabilizing 
nominal  consumption or nominal  output.  To  ensure  that employment  will indeed 
be  at its first  best level,  equations 3.3  and  3.5  imply  that employment  will 
be  deterministic and  that employment  will be  chosen  such  that ~'(1-h)  =  X3w 
or,  equivalently,  that employment  will be  chosen  such  that there is  not any 
under-loveremployment.  From  equation 3.1  this implies that equation 4.5  will 
also be  satisfied. 
Pursuing a policy to  stabilize nominal  output implies a procyclical 
monetary policy when  the income  elasticity of  money  demand  is  greater than 
one,  or a countercyclical monetary  policy when  the income  elasticity of  money 
demand  is less than one.  Recall  that prices fall more  (in percentage  terms) 
than the percentage  increase in  output when  the income  elasticity of money 
demand  is  greater than one.  Therefore,  nominal  output will fall (rise)  when 
there is  a good  (bad)  productivity shock.  Stabilizing nominal  output  in  this case  necessitates pursuing a procyclical monetary policy.  Similarly, if the 
income  elasticity of  money  demand  is less than one,  productivity and  nominal 
output move  together,  so  stabilizing nominal  output  will entail a 
countercyclical  monetary  policy. 
Recalling our earlier result,  this policy will also satisfy the 
Friedmanlsidrauski money  supply rule.  Similarly,  from equation 3.10,  a pol  icy 
to  target the nominal  interest rate will  ensure  that quantities are chosen  at 
their optimal  level,  suggesting  that the Federal  Reserve  Bank's  current policy 
may  be  correct.  This policy also requires the monetary  authorities to  react 
to  yesterday's recessions and  booms,  because  investment  causes  independent 
productivity shocks  to  translate into serially correlated output over  time. 
Since wage  setters can  readily observe  the current capital stock that was 
carried over  from the previous period,  these monetary  supply changes  will  be 
completely anticipated and reflected  in  the agreed-upon nominal  wage  rate. 
Unfortunately,  as  will be  seen  in  the next subsection,  the result that 
targeting nominal  interest rates or targeting nominal  output is  optimal 
depends  on the assumption  that utility is logarithmic in  consumption. 
However,  the result that the optimal  monetary policy might be  procyclical  is 
still true depending on  the elasticity of substitution of  consumption  over 
time,  that is  whether  a  <  (>I 1. 
B.  Logarithmic Real  Balances,  b=l 
This  subsection  considers  the case  when  utility is  logarithmic  in  real 
money  balances,  but "a" is  allowed to  vary.  The  optimal  labor  supply  in  this 
case  will no longer be  constant.  Whether  the substitution effect or the income  effect dominates  will depend  on  the  substitutability of consumption 
over  time.  From  equations  3.3'  and  3.4',  the optimal  (flex wage)  labor  supply 
i  s 
From  equation  4.8  labor  supply when  wages  are flexible will increase 
(decrease)  with positive productivity shocks  when  a <  (>) 1.  This  results 
because  of the assumed  concavity of v(.)  and  because  both current and  expected 
future  consumption  increase  with positive productivity shocks. 
The  way  in  which  the economy  evolves  given the presence  of a nominal 
contracting constraint is similar to  before.  The  following equations  express 
the way  in  which output is divided between  consumption  and  investment,  the 
money  demand  function,  and  the number  of hours  worked  when  the economy  is 
subject to  nominal  wage  contracting and  b=l. 
00 
where  Dt  =  C(~R)~E~+~(C~;~)  and 
s=o 
Since  neither X3t nor  wt  is affected  by productivity shocks equation 4.5  shows  that as  with flexible wages,  employment  will increase 
(decrease)  with increases in  productivity when  a  <  0)  1.  The  borderline case 
is  when  a=l,  or when  utility is logarithmic  in  both consumption  and  real 
money.  This  is the only case  in  which the monetary  authorities should  target 
the money  supply.  The  reason  that employment  can  either increase or decrease 
with positive productivity shocks  is again because,  the income  elasticity of 
money  demand  is greater (less)  than one  when  a  <  (>I 1. 
However,  employment  would  increase or decrease more  than would be 
optimal  given an  increase in  productivity.  Using an  asterisk to  denote  the 
optimal  level,  equations 4.5  and  4.9  show  that employment  can only be  at the 
optimal  level when  vl(l-h*)  =  X3w.  However,  when  b=l,  X3 does  not 
depend  on 8.  Therefore,  employment  wi  11  be  optimal only when  h* is 
constant,  that is  when  a=l.  This is because  in  a spot market,  workers  choose 
their labor supply  so  that vl(l-h)  =  X3w,  implying that a worker  would  not 
want  to change  the number  of  hours he  works  when  productivity changes.  When  a 
<  1,  h*  increases  with 8,  implying that vl(l-h*)  >  X3w.  Thus 
overemployment occurs when  productivity is greater than expected,  and 
underemployment  occurs when  productivity is less than expected.  When  real 
wages  are  too low in  booms  and  too high in  recessions,  the monetary  authority 
should pursue a countercyclical monetary policy.  Similarly,  when  a  >  1, 
vl(l-h*)  <  (>I X3w with good  (bad)  productivity shocks.  In  this 
situation, it would  be  optimal  to follow a procyclical money  supply rule. 
V.  Conclusions 
This paper  showed  that optimal  monetary  policy in  a model  where  wages 
are "sticky" because  of  a nominal  contracting constraint can  be  either procyclical  or countercyclical  (as  measured  against output).  Perhaps  the 
possibility for unconventional  monetary  policy arising from such  a model  is 
not altogether  suprising;  however,  it  points to  the need  for discussing the 
policy implications of  macroeconomic  models  in  an  optimizing framework.  The 
policy objectives that are frequently thought  to  follow from nominal 
contracting models,  namely  stabilizing output,  prices,  or a constant money 
supply,  are optimal  only in  extreme  cases.  For  example,  if there are no real 
shocks,  all three objectives produce  the optimal monetary  policy.  When  a=b=l, 
a money  supply rule also is  optimal,  or when  "a" approaches  infinity,  so  that 
the household  is infinitely risk-averse (a "maxi-min" utility  function),  a 
policy rule to  stabilize prices is  also optimal. 
However,  in  addition to  these  extreme  cases,  a slightly more  general 
case  when  utility is  logarithmic  in  consumption results in  a well-defined 
policy rule for this economy.  This  case  indicates that a policy rule designed 
either to stabilize nominal  output or to  peg  the nominal  interest rate will be 
optimal.  Both of these policies actually correspond  to  either a procycl  ical 
or countercyclical  money  supply rule,  depending on  "b",  or the income 
elasticity of  money  demand. 
Although this paper  discusses  optimal monetary policy,  actual policy 
prescriptions should be  tempered  with the reliance of these policy rules on 
the form of the utility  function.  Policy conclusions from the model  are 
tentative at best,  given that the model  assumes  that nominal  wage-contracting 
exists but does  not explain why  parties contract in  nominal  instead of  real 
terms.  For  example,  it  is likely that an  explanation for nominal  contracting 
will be  to  have  noisy observations of the price level  similar to  Lucas  (1972). 
The  correct policy prescription, if this were  the case,  would undoubtedly  call 
for  a we1 1  -defined money  supply rule. Given  the limited data available,  the model  tentatively suggests  that 
the proper monetary  policy in  a world with nominal  wage  contracts  is 
procyclical.  This rests on  studies (for example,  Grossman  and  Shiller [19811, 
and  Friend and  Blume  [19751> that estimate the relative degree of  risk 
aversion,  "a",  to  be  between  two  and  four.  However,  given the  lack of  data on 
"b",  the policy rule for when  utility is  logarithmic in  consumption  would 
probably be  preferred,  because  the optimal  policy is well-defined and  is 
independent of "b" in this special  case.  Monetary  policy designed  to  peg the 
nominal  interest rate or to target nominal  output will be  optimal  in  this case. 
This paper  has  sought  to  map  Fischer into an  optimization framework,  and 
to  discuss  whether  these  differences have  different policy implications.  The 
first  difference is that Fischer's  two-period nominal  contracts are collapsed 
into one  period.  In  Fischer's model,  policymakers  cannot act instantaneously 
to  economy-wide  shocks,  as  they  can  in this paper.  Policy in  his paper 
resulted from the assumption  that shocks  were  correlated over  time,  which 
allowed policymakers to  use  information about  the previous period's  shock  in 
order  to  predict the shock  that would occur  in the current period.  This paper 
has  one-period wage  contracts;  however,  it  retains the essence  of  Fischer's 
paper  since contracts are drawn  up  in  advance of both monetary and  real 
shocks.  Policymakers  are assumed  to  have  perfect information in  which  to 
react to  outside shocks  instead of  a noisy signal,  as  in  Fischer's original 
paper.  Incorporating this element  does  not seem  to  affect the policy rules 
derived in  this paper.  However,  this difference would make  it  even  harder  to 
prescribe monetary  policy. 
The  second  difference between  the optimization model  set up  in this 
paper  and  the set of  equations formulated  by  Fischer  is the type of  shocks - 21  - 
assumed to affect the economy.  Real  productivity shocks are assumed in this 
paper, while Fischer had shocks affecting  aggregate demand, aggregate supply, 
and money demand.  Keynesians might not accept that shifts in the aggregate 
supply schedule are caused by real  productivity shocks.  However, given that 
Fischer assumed rational  expectations, it seems reasonable to treat shocks to 
aggregate supply as productivity shocks.  Assumed shocks to aggregate demand 
would have to be modeled as shocks to the utility function. 
Although the model  shows that a procyclical money supply with respect to 
output may be optimal, it nevertheless has conventional countercyclical 
monetary policy implications with respect to  employment.  Similarly, using the 
evidence we have on "a",  the model  suggests that given a constant money 
supply, employment would be countercyclical.  However, this result depends on 
the assumption of 100  percent depreciation as well as the assumption that 
consumption and leisure are separable. 
If  nominal  contracting models are going to be useful for policy 
analysis, then future work is necessary in order to  address two concerns.  The 
first is to build a model  in which nominal  contracts arise endogenously.  The 
second area of future research is to  determine if  nominal  contracts are 
empirically relevant for the study of  business cycles.  This question has been 
tested by Ahmed (1985), who showed that in Canada the amount to which 
employment and output responded to  money shocks was insignificantly correlated 
with the amount of  indexing in labor contracts.  This provides some evidence 
against nominal  contracting models.  However, future work is still  needed 
because  industries that naturally respond more to monetary disturbances would 
probably have larger incentives to index their wage contracts.  Until  such 
work is done, nominal wage-contracting models should not be used for  policy 
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